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OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 
This appeal revolves around the liquidation of defaulted 
mortgage-backed securities that were subject to two repurchase 
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agreements.  Following multiple rounds of litigation before the 
Bankruptcy and District Courts, George E. Miller, Chapter 7 
trustee for the estate of HomeBanc Corp., seeks our review.  
On appeal, we address these questions:  (1) whether a 
Bankruptcy Court’s determination of good faith regarding an 
obligatory post-default valuation of mortgage-backed 
securities subject to a repurchase agreement receives plenary 
review as a question of law or clear-error review as a question 
of fact;  (2) whether “damages,” as described in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(47)(A)(v), requires a non-breaching party to bring a 
legal claim for damages or merely experience a post-
liquidation loss for the conditions of 11 U.S.C. § 562 to apply;  
(3) whether the safe harbor protections of 11 U.S.C. § 559 can 
apply to a non-breaching party that has no excess proceeds 
after exercising the contractual right to liquidate a repurchase 
agreement; and (4) whether Bear Stearns liquidated the 
securities at issue in compliance with the terms of the parties’ 
repurchase agreements.  Because we agree with the disposition 
of the District Court, we will affirm. 
I 
HomeBanc Corp. (“HomeBanc”) was in the business of 
originating, securitizing, and servicing residential mortgage 
loans.  From 2005 through 2007, HomeBanc obtained 
financing from Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. and Bear Stearns 
International Ltd. (jointly referred to as “Bear Stearns”) 
pursuant to two repurchase agreements:1 a Master Repurchase 
                                                 
1 A repurchase agreement, typically referred to as a “repo,” is 
“[a] short-term loan agreement by which one party sells a 
security to another party but promises to buy back the security 
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Agreement (“MRA”) dated September 19, 2005 and a Global 
Master Repurchasing Agreement (“GMRA”) dated October 4, 
2005.2  Transactions were accompanied by a confirmation that 
included the purchase date, purchase price, repurchase date, 
and pricing rate.  HomeBanc transferred to Bear Stearns 
multiple securities in June 2006, June 2007, and July 2007; 
however, nine of the securities—the securities at issue 
(“SAI”)—were accompanied by confirmations showing a 
purchase price of zero and open repurchase dates.3 
On Tuesday, August 7, 2007, HomeBanc’s repo 
transactions became due, requiring HomeBanc to buy back 
thirty-seven outstanding securities, including the nine SAI, at 
an aggregate price of approximately $64 million.  Bear Stearns, 
concerned about HomeBanc’s liquidity, offered to roll (extend) 
the repurchase deadline for an immediate payment of roughly 
$27 million.  Bear Stearns alternatively offered to purchase 
thirty-six of the securities outright for approximately $60.5 
million, but HomeBanc rejected this proposal.  HomeBanc 
failed to repurchase the securities or pay for an extension of the 
due date by the close of business on August 7.  The following 
afternoon, Bear Stearns issued a notice of default that gave 
HomeBanc until the close of business on Thursday, August 9, 
2007, to make payment in full.  No funds were forthcoming.  
Consequently, Bear Stearns sent formal default notices to 
                                                 
on a specified date at a specified price.”  Repurchase 
Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).   
2 Bear Stearns held the nine securities at issue (“SAI”) in this 
case under the GMRA. 
3 An “open repurchase date” means that the security is payable 
on demand. 
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HomeBanc on August 9, 2007, and later that day, HomeBanc 
filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.4 
Upon HomeBanc’s default, the MRA and GMRA 
required Bear Stearns to determine the value of the thirty-seven 
remaining repo securities.  This meant that Bear Stearns, within 
its broad discretion, had to reach a “reasonable opinion” 
regarding the securities’ “fair market value, having regard to 
such pricing sources and methods . . .  as [it] . . . consider[ed] 
appropriate.”  J.A. 1038.  
Bear Stearns, claiming outright ownership of the 
securities, decided to auction them to determine their fair 
market value.  Auction solicitations were distributed between 
the morning of Friday, August 10 and Tuesday, August 14, 
stating that Bear Stearns intended to auction thirty-six of the 
securities on August 14, 2017.5   The bid solicitations listed the 
available securities, including their unique CUSIP identifiers, 
                                                 
4 The bankruptcy was later converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding 
in February 2009. 
5 One of the thirty-seven remaining securities was excluded 
from the August 14, 2007 auction because J.P. Morgan had 
agreed with HomeBanc to purchase the security for $1 million.  
Ultimately, J.P. Morgan did not buy the security, and as a 
result, it was subsequently auctioned on August 17, 2007.  Bear 
Stearns’s mortgage trading desk submitted the highest bid, 
purchasing the security for $1,256,000. 
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original face values, and current factors.6  Bear Stearns’s 
finance desk sent the bid solicitation to approximately 200 
different entities, including investment banks and advisors, 
pension and hedge funds, asset managers, and real estate 
investment trusts.  In some cases, multiple individuals within a 
single entity were solicited.  The finance desk also sought bids 
from Bear Stearns’s mortgage trading desk, implementing 
extra safeguards to prevent any insider advantage.   
The auction yielded two bids.  Tricadia Capital, LLC 
submitted a bid of approximately $2.2 million for two 
securities, and Bear Stearns’s mortgage trading desk placed an 
“all or nothing” bid of $60.5 million, the same amount Bear 
Stearns had offered before HomeBanc’s default.  After the 
auction closed, Bear Stearns’s finance desk determined that 
Bear Stearns’s mortgage trading desk had won.  Bear Stearns 
allocated the bid across the thirty-six securities on August 15: 
$52.4 million to twenty-seven securities and $8.1 million 
divided evenly among the nine SAI ($900,000 apiece).   
Despite its default and the results of the auction, 
HomeBanc believed itself entitled to the August 2007 principal 
and interest payments from the thirty-seven securities; Bear 
Stearns disagreed.  Wells Fargo Bank, administratively holding 
the securities, commenced this adversary proceeding by filing 
an interpleader complaint on October 25, 2007.  HomeBanc 
and Bear Stearns asserted cross-claims against each other.  
After depositing the August 2007 payment with the 
                                                 
6 A CUSIP is a nine-digit numeric or alphanumeric code that 
identifies financial securities to facilitate clearing and 
settlement of trades. 
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Bankruptcy Court, Wells Fargo was subsequently dismissed 
from the proceedings.  The cross-claims between HomeBanc 
and Bear Stearns remained. 
A. HomeBanc I7   
After HomeBanc’s bankruptcy was converted to a 
Chapter 7 proceeding, George Miller was appointed as trustee 
for the estate.  Miller brought several claims against Bear 
Stearns, including (1) conversion (for selling the SAI via 
auction when HomeBanc asserted that it had superior title and 
interest), (2) violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay (by 
auctioning the SAI), and (3) breach of contract (for improperly 
valuing the SAI in violation of the GMRA).   
With respect to these three claims, the Bankruptcy 
Court granted Bear Stearns’s motion for summary judgment.  
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, an automatic stay halts any 
actions by creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 362.  However, § 559 
generally allows repo participants to exercise a contractual 
right to liquidate securities without judicial interference.  11 
U.S.C. § 559.  The Bankruptcy Court held that the transactions 
underlying the nine SAI constituted repurchase agreements 
under 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(A)(i) and (v), bringing the SAI 
within the safe harbor protections of § 559.  Thus, Bear Stearns 
had the right to liquidate the securities: it did not violate the 
automatic bankruptcy stay or convert the securities.  See J.A. 
                                                 
7 There are four decisions relevant to this appeal that the parties 
denote as HomeBanc I, Home Banc II, HomeBanc III, and 
HomeBanc IV.  We make reference to those decisions in like 
manner. 
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44-45 (“Bankruptcy Code § 559 permits liquidation of 
securities in accordance with a party’s contractual rights, and 
the GMRA permits the Bear Stearns defendants to act within 
their discretion” to sell the securities upon default.).  
The Bankruptcy Court also entered summary judgment 
against HomeBanc on the breach of contract claim.  
Interpreting the GMRA, which is governed by English contract 
law, the Bankruptcy Court noted that while the agreement 
required Bear Stearns to rationally appraise the SAI in good 
faith, Bear Stearns had sizeable discretion in coming to a fair 
market valuation.  Due to this broad discretion, the Court held 
that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether Bear 
Stearns complied with the GMRA since using a bidding 
process to value securities was typical practice in the industry 
at the time. 
B. HomeBanc II 
HomeBanc appealed to the District Court, arguing that 
the Bankruptcy Court erred by (1) determining that the 
transactions involving the SAI qualified as repurchase 
agreements entitled to the safe harbor protections of § 559; (2) 
interpreting the GMRA to impose a nonexistent subjective 
rationality standard for Bear Stearns to value the securities 
upon HomeBanc’s default; and (3) deciding that the sale of the 
SAI was rational and in good faith.   
The District Court affirmed on the first two issues but 
remanded for further proceedings as to whether Bear Stearns 
complied with the GMRA in good faith.  First, the District 
Court decided that the transactions underlying the SAI did not 
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qualify as repos under § 101(47)(A)(i) because the 
confirmations accompanying the transactions showed that the 
securities had a purchase price of zero, allowing the SAI to 
“have been transferred back . . . without being ‘against the 
transfer of funds . . . .’” 8  J.A. 59-60.  Instead, they were credit 
enhancements under § 101(47)(A)(v).9  “There is no doubt that 
                                                 
8 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(A)(i), (v) (“The term ‘repurchase 
agreement’ (which definition also applies to a reverse 
repurchase agreement)-- (A) means-- 
(i) an agreement . . . which provides for the transfer of one or 
more . . . mortgage related securities . . . against the transfer 
of funds . . . with a simultaneous agreement by such transferee 
to transfer to the transferor thereof . . . interests of the kind 
described in this clause, at a date certain not later than 1 year 
after such transfer or on demand, against the transfer of funds 
. . . ; 
(v) any security agreement or arrangement or other credit 
enhancement related to any agreement or transaction referred 
to in clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) . . . .) (emphasis added). 
9 Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define “credit 
enhancement,” the term encompasses various ways that a 
borrower may improve its credit standing and reassure lenders 
that it will honor its debt obligations.  See Credit Enhancement, 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (2014).  
Here, the District Court held that HomeBanc engaged in 
“credit enhancement” by providing additional collateral to 
Bear Stearns with a purchase price of zero.  See 
Overcollateralization, THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, INVESTMENT AND BANKING (1st ed. 
2010).   
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the disputed transactions were part and parcel of their 
undisputed repo transactions.  It therefore seems to me that the 
extra securities were plainly within the umbrella of ‘credit 
enhancements.’”  J.A. 60 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(A)(v)).  
While the nine SAI were credit enhancements rather than 
traditional repos,10 the District Court still held that they 
received the protections of § 559. 
As to HomeBanc’s second claim, the District Court 
decided that the Bankruptcy Court correctly discerned the 
relevant English law, finding that the GMRA’s “reasonable 
opinion” language equated to a “good faith” requirement. 
The Court, responding to HomeBanc’s last argument, 
held that the record created a fact question as to whether Bear 
Stearns acted in good faith by auctioning the SAI.  Two 
concerns led to this decision.  First, only Bear Stearns 
submitted a bid that included the nine SAI.  J.A. 62 (“When . . 
. Bear Stearns was the winning bidder because it was the only 
bidder, I think that is indisputable evidence that the market was 
not working, or that there was something else wrong with the 
auction process.”).  Second, the District Court believed that the 
Bankruptcy Judge erroneously discounted the opinion of 
HomeBanc’s expert witness, who stated that Bear Stearns 
designed the auction to dissuade outside bidders.  Because of 
these issues, the case was remanded for further proceedings to 
determine if the auction complied with the GMRA. 
                                                 
10 The District Court concluded that the other twenty-eight of 
the thirty-seven securities were traditional repos under 11 
U.S.C. § 101(47)(A)(i). 
 12 
 
C. HomeBanc III 
Upon remand and after a six-day trial, the Bankruptcy 
Court ruled that the auction was fair and customary, and 
therefore, Bear Stearns acted in good faith accepting the 
auction results as the fair market value of the thirty-seven 
securities.  In reaching this holding, the Bankruptcy Court 
divided the question of good faith compliance with the GMRA 
into “three parts: (i) whether Bear Stearns’[s] decision to 
determine the Net Value of the Securities at Issue by auction 
in August 2007 was rational or in good faith; (ii) whether the 
auction process utilized by Bear Stearns was in accordance 
with industry standards; and (iii) whether Bear Stearns’[s] 
acceptance of the value obtained through the auction was 
rational or in good faith.”  J.A. 76. 
The Court, in addressing the first sub-question, 
concluded that Bear Stearns acted in good faith by determining 
the securities’ value via an auction, despite the turbulent 
condition of the residential mortgage-backed securities market 
in August 2007.  HomeBanc argued that an auction cannot 
provide accurate price discovery when a market is 
dysfunctional, and while HomeBanc presented testimony that 
the residential mortgage-backed securities market was non-
functional in August 2007, there was substantial opposing 
testimony that the market, though troubled, was functioning.  
“[T]here was [also] no evidence of other factors that might be 
considered indicia of market dysfunction: asymmetrical 
information between buyers and sellers, inadequate 
information in general . . . , market panic . . . , high transaction 
costs, the absence of any creditworthy market participants or 
fraud.”  J.A. 86.  Moreover, “there was no indication . . . when 
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or if market prices would stabilize.”  J.A. 85-87.  It was 
therefore reasonable for Bear Stearns to quickly liquidate the 
collateral via a sale.  Because the Court found that the market 
was functioning in August 2007, it concluded that the auction 
was a commercially reasonable determinant of value. 
Bear Stearns’s auction process was also found to be 
reasonable: the procedures provided possible bidders with 
sufficient information to formulate a bid; the 4.5 days to place 
bids was more than what was typically given to sophisticated 
purchasers of residential mortgage-backed securities; Bear 
Stearns solicited many potential buyers, including its main 
competitors; and the rules prevented a Bear Stearns affiliate 
from gaining an unfair advantage in formulating its bid. 
Lastly, the Court held that Bear Stearns acted in good 
faith when it accepted the outcome of the auction as the fair 
market value of the SAI.  HomeBanc maintained that the 
auction results were egregious.  Using its own discounted cash 
flow model, HomeBanc valued the nine SAI at $124.6 million.  
HomeBanc’s Chief Investment Officer, however, estimated the 
value of the SAI at approximately $18.5 million on August 5, 
2007—nine days before the auction closed—a value much 
closer to Bear Stearns’s $8.1 million assessment on August 15, 
2017.  The Bankruptcy Court also highlighted that (1) 
HomeBanc tried and failed to find an alternative purchaser who 
would pay more for the thirty-seven securities, and (2) Bear 
Stearns paid a higher price for the thirty-seventh security than 
HomeBanc bargained for with J.P. Morgan. 
D. HomeBanc IV 
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HomeBanc appealed again, initially contending that 
Bear Stearns did not act in good faith because the auction was 
held in a non-functioning market, failed to produce an actual 
sale, and resulted in an inexplicable valuation of the SAI.  
Finding that the Bankruptcy Court’s good faith determination 
was one of historical fact and not clearly erroneous, the District 
Court upheld the judgment.  The Court faulted HomeBanc for 
failing to demonstrate that the mortgage-backed securities 
market was dysfunctional in August 2007 or that the auction 
was carried out in bad faith. 
HomeBanc alternatively asserted that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred by ignoring the safe harbor limits for credit 
enhancements under 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(A)(v).  Unlike the 
broad protections of § 559 that are available for 
§ 101(47)(A)(i) repos, HomeBanc believed that credit 
enhancements under § 101(47)(A)(v) receive fewer protections 
under § 562.  “The extent to which credit enhancements qualify 
as repurchase agreements entitled to bankruptcy safe harbor 
protection is ‘not to exceed the damages in connection with any 
such agreement or transaction,’” which must be measured by 
“‘commercially reasonable determinants of value.’”  J.A. 116-
17 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(47)(A)(v), 562).     
Based on the connection between §§ 101(47)(A)(v) and 
562, HomeBanc claimed that the Bankruptcy Court failed to 
(1) recognize that Bear Stearns had violated the automatic 
bankruptcy stay and converted the securities, and (2) determine 
whether the auction was a “commercially reasonable 
determinant” of the securities’ value.  The District Court 
disagreed, holding that § 562 was inapplicable.  Since Bear 
Stearns’s liquidation of HomeBanc securities resulted in 
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excess proceeds and Bear Stearns never asserted a claim for 
damages, the District Court reasoned that the broad safe harbor 
protections of § 559, not § 562, were relevant.  HomeBanc 
timely appealed to this Court. 
II 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334, and the District Court 
exercised its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  28 
U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) provides this Court with jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s final order. 
This Court’s “review of the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s decision 
effectively amounts to review of the [B]ankruptcy [C]ourt’s 
opinion in the first instance.”  In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 
1222 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  We 
exercise plenary review of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and clear-error review 
of its factual findings.  See In re J & S Properties, LLC, 872 
F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 2017); In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 
788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986).   
The parties dispute the standard of review that applies 
to the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of good faith.  
HomeBanc asserts that a good faith determination constitutes 
a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to clear-error 
review for the underlying factual findings and plenary review 
for the Bankruptcy Court’s “choice and interpretation of legal 
precepts and its application of those precepts to historical 
facts.”  In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 134 F.3d 188, 193 (3d 
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Cir. 1998).  Bear Stearns responds that only clear-error review 
applies because HomeBanc “sets forth ‘no choice and 
interpretation of legal precepts’ of the Bankruptcy Court to 
which plenary review would be appropriate.”  Appellee Br. at 
29 (quoting In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 
147, 152 (D. Del. 1999)). 
As a general matter, this Court has long considered the 
determination of good faith to be an “ultimate fact.”  Hickey v. 
Ritz-Carlton Rest. & Hotel Co. of Atlantic City, 96 F.2d 748, 
750-51 (3d Cir. 1938).  An ultimate fact is commonly 
expressed in a standard enunciated by statute or by a caselaw 
rule, like negligence or reasonableness, and “[t]he ultimate 
finding is a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a 
mixed question of law and fact.” Universal Minerals v. C.A. 
Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981).  Consequently, 
factual findings are reviewed for clear-error while “the trial 
court’s choice and interpretation of legal precepts and its 
application of those precepts to the historical facts” receive 
plenary review.  Id. at 103.  
 Despite these general precepts, determining the 
applicable standard of review here is not so straightforward.  
We have previously held that whether a party filed a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy petition in good faith is an ultimate fact subject 
to review as a mixed question of law and fact.  In re 15375 
Memorial Corp. v. Bepco, 589 F.3d 605, 616 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Similarly, we have concluded that whether a debtor is insolvent 
is an ultimate fact requiring mixed review.  See Trans World 
Airlines, 134 F.3d at 193.  Some District Courts, however, have 
held that good faith determinations under § 363(m) of the 
Bankruptcy Code receive clear-error review.  See In re 
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Polaroid Corp., No. 03-1168-JJF, 2004 WL 2223301, at *2 (D. 
Del. Sept. 30, 2004); In re Prosser, Bankr. L. Rep. 82, 437 
(D.V.I. Mar. 8, 2013).  
 A determination of good faith necessarily flows from 
consideration of an array of underlying basic facts, making it 
an ultimate fact.  See Universal Minerals, 669 F.2d at 102; 
Hickey, 96 F.2d at 750-51.  Yet, the distinction between basic 
and ultimate facts can be murky; sometimes, there are 
intermediate steps on the path to an ultimate fact.  See In re 
15375 Memorial Corp., 589 F.3d at 616 (referring to basic, 
inferred, and ultimate facts).  This opacity gives us some pause, 
but no intermediate steps are currently before us for review.  
We therefore hold that a bankruptcy court’s determination of 
good faith regarding a mandatory post-default valuation of 
collateral subject to a repurchase agreement is an ultimate fact 
subject to mixed review.11  A bankruptcy court’s basic factual 
findings are examined for clear-error while the ultimate fact of 
good faith receives plenary review. 
III 
 On appeal, HomeBanc challenges the District Court’s 
decision that § 559, not § 562, was controlling and that Bear 
Stearns did not violate the automatic bankruptcy stay.  Section 
559 gives parties to a repurchase agreement a safe harbor from 
the automatic bankruptcy stay, which normally prevents 
creditors from collecting, recovering, or offsetting debts 
                                                 
11 We do not (and need not) decide whether good faith is 
always an ultimate fact requiring mixed review. 
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without court approval.12  Thus, § 559 generally permits a non-
defaulting party to liquidate collateral, according to the terms 
of the relevant repurchase agreement, without seeking court 
approval.  Section 562 also provides a safe harbor, though it is 
more limited.  For instance, § 562 requires that “damages” be 
measured at a certain time and using a “commercially 
reasonable determinant of value.”  11 U.S.C. § 562.   
As to whether § 559 or § 562 applies here, the text of 
§ 101(47)(A)(v) is dispositive.  Subparagraph (v) specifies that 
repos include credit enhancements, but such credit 
enhancements are “not to exceed the damages in connection 
with any such agreement or transaction, measured in 
accordance with section 562 of this title.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(47)(a)(v) (emphasis added).  While the protections of 
§ 559 are generally available, the safe harbor does not 
encompass a recovery beyond the “damages” claimed.  We 
therefore must define “damages,” as found in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(47)(A)(v), to determine if § 562 applies to the nine 
SAI—each of which is a credit enhancement. 
                                                 
12 Section 559 states in part: “The exercise of a contractual 
right of a repo participant or financial participant to cause 
the liquidation . . . of a repurchase agreement . . . shall not be 
stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by . . . order of a court or 
administrative agency . . . [and] any excess of the market 
prices received on liquidation of such assets . . . over the sum 
of the stated repurchase prices and all expenses in connection 
with the liquidation of such repurchase agreements shall be 
deemed property of the estate . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 559 
(emphasis added). 
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   HomeBanc asks this Court to interpret “damages” as 
meaning a “shortfall,” “loss,” “deficiency,” or “debt.”  This 
would mean that when a repo participant liquidates a credit 
enhancement after default, any amount obtained in excess of 
the actual deficiency suffered, as measured according to § 562, 
is subject to the automatic bankruptcy stay, even if the surplus 
took years to develop.  Conversely, Bear Stearns argues that if 
there is no claim for damages, then § 562 is inapplicable: The 
definition of “damages” must include a legal claim.   
“Damages” is not defined within Title 11, but we hold 
for several reasons that the term refers to a legal claim for 
damages rather than a “loss,” “shortfall,” “deficiency,” or 
“debt.”  First, “damages” is a term of art.  Although probably 
not obvious to the layperson, every first-year law student learns 
to automatically connect “damages” with what is potentially 
recoverable in court, and not necessarily an underlying loss or 
injury.13  Damages are “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be 
paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury.”  
Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); 1 DAN 
B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION § 3.1 (2d ed. 1993) (“The damages remedy is a 
judicial award in money, payable as compensation to one who 
has suffered a legally recognized injury or harm.”).  This is a 
plain term, and as a result, defining “damages” as a “debt” or 
                                                 
13 At oral argument, counsel for HomeBanc inadvertently 
showed how “damages” are inextricably tied to a legal claim.  
He stated, “I think the damages are the - the recovery to which 
you may be entitled, if you prove some liability.”  Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 14, In re HomeBanc Mortgage Corp. (3d 
Cir. Sept. 26, 2019) (No. 19-2887).  
 20 
 
“loss” without any associated legal claim would contradict 
common understanding within the legal profession.   
Second, “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.”  Am. Home Mortg., 637 F.3d at 255 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  If Congress had wanted to define 
“damages” in a manner different from its commonly 
understood meaning, such as a “loss,” “deficiency,” or “debt,” 
it could have done so.  These terms appear elsewhere in Title 
11, yet Congress chose not to employ them here.  See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. §§ 703(b), 726(a)(4), 727(a)(12)(B). 
Third, other parts of Title 11 support a plain legal 
interpretation of “damages.”  “Damages” is used throughout 
Title 11 to refer to a legal claim.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 110(h)(5)(i)(1)(A)-(i)(2), 362 (k)(1)-(2), 523 
(a)(19)(B)(iii).  Moreover, the text of § 502(g)(2) and the 
section title of § 562 suggest that “damages” means a legal 
claim for loss.14   
Fourth, defining “damages” as a “loss,” “shortfall,” or 
“debt” would create a problematic process for creditors 
seeking to quickly liquidate collateral after a default.  Under 
HomeBanc’s proposed approach, a non-defaulting party would 
                                                 
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(2) (“A claim for damages calculated 
in accordance with section 562 . . . .”); 11 U.S.C. § 562 
(“Timing of damage measurement in connection with swap 
agreements, securities contracts, forward contracts, 
commodity contracts, repurchase agreements, and master 
netting agreements”). 
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first determine which collateral constitutes a repurchase 
agreement under § 101(47)(A)(i) versus a credit enhancement 
under § 101(47)(A)(v): repurchase agreements would receive 
the full protection of § 559 while credit enhancements would 
be subject to the conditions of §§ 101(47)(A)(v) and 562.  Once 
the collateral was categorized, a creditor could liquidate only 
the § 101(47)(A)(i) repos.  Afterwards, the non-defaulting 
party would determine if there was any remaining shortfall.  If 
so, then the § 101(47)(A)(v) credit enhancements could be 
sold, one at a time, to fill the hole. 
We consider HomeBanc’s approach impractical.  
Whether a transaction is a repurchase agreement under 
§ 101(47)(A)(i) or a credit enhancement under § 101(47)(A)(v) 
is not always clear cut—the parties in this case litigated this 
issue for almost a decade.  Creditors often seek to liquidate 
quickly, but a need to differentiate between repos and credit 
enhancements would substantially slow this process.  It is also 
likely that repo participants would litigate this issue because of 
the potential application of §§ 101(47)(A)(v) and 562.  
Moreover, the need to differentiate between repurchase 
agreements and credit enhancements could eliminate the 
ability to buy or sell collateral via “all or nothing” bids.  Bear 
Stearns, in this case, would have had to conduct multiple 
separate auctions: an initial auction to value the twenty-eight 
traditional repos and subsequent auctions to individually value 
the nine credit enhancements to cover any shortfall.  Bear 
Stearns could not have made an “all or nothing” bid for the 
remaining securities.  Such an approach is unduly 
cumbersome.  The literal application of the statute, in contrast, 
does not produce “an absurd result.” See Douglass v. 
Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).   
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HomeBanc does raise one concern about our approach 
which we consider valid: interpreting “damages” to require a 
deficiency claim may incentivize bad behavior.  A non-
defaulting party may seek to price the collateral at a level equal 
to the debt owed by the defaulting party, keeping any upside 
for itself and avoiding judicial scrutiny simply by not asserting 
a deficiency claim.  The nature of repos, however, provides 
parties with the opportunity to address this issue contractually.  
For example, the GMRA requires a good faith valuation, and 
other agreements could do likewise.  Furthermore, if a 
creditor’s loss is sufficiently large, it will seek damages, even 
if doing so invites judicial scrutiny.  Because of the 
aforementioned reasons, we hold that “damages” as described 
in § 101(47)(A)(v) necessitates the filing of a deficiency claim. 
IV 
Though § 562 is inapplicable because Bear Stearns did 
not initiate a damages action, it appears that the auction did not 
yield excess proceeds.  As this Court has explained, excess 
proceeds result when “the market prices exceed the stated 
repurchase prices.”  Am. Home Mortg., 637 F.3d at 255-56.  At 
the time of HomeBanc’s default, the contractual repurchase 
price for the thirty-seven securities was approximately $64 
million, but the auction netted only $61.756 million.  That is a 
shortfall, not an excess. 
Notwithstanding the lack of excess proceeds, we 
conclude that the Bankruptcy Court appropriately applied 
§ 559.  Most importantly, the text of § 559 does not require 
excess proceeds:    
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The exercise of a contractual right of a repo 
participant or financial participant to cause the 
liquidation . . . a repurchase agreement . . . shall 
not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by 
operation of any provision of this title or by order 
of a court or administrative agency . . . . In the 
event that a repo participant or financial 
participant liquidates one or more repurchase 
agreements . . . and under the terms of one or 
more such agreements has agreed to deliver 
assets subject to repurchase agreements to the 
debtor, any excess of the market prices 
received on liquidation of such assets . . . over 
the sum of the stated repurchase prices and all 
expenses in connection with the liquidation of 
such repurchase agreements shall be deemed 
property of the estate . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 559 (emphasis added).  Section 559 states that “any 
excess . . . shall be deemed property of the estate.”  It does not 
say “the excess.”  “Any” is commonly used to refer to 
indefinite or unknown quantities.15  For instance, is there any 
money left in the bank account?  In § 559, the indefinite or 
unknown quantity is the excess.  There may be an excess, but 
the text does not demand that one exists.  Rather, it establishes 
a condition—transferring the property to the estate—if there 
                                                 
15 See Any, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any#learn-
more; Any, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
https://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/8973?redirectedFrom=any#eid. 
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are excess proceeds.  The text reveals that § 559 can apply 
when there is an excess, shortfall, or break-even amount. 
We recognize that in American Home Mortgage we 
stated that “[s]ections 559 and 562 address different situations.  
Section 559 applies only in the event that a . . . liquidation 
results in excess proceeds. . . . § 562 . . . applies when the 
contract is liquidated, terminated, or accelerated, and results in 
damages rather than excess proceeds.”  637 F.3d at 255-56 
(emphasis added).  Taken out of context, this dictum could be 
wrongly interpreted to suggest that § 559’s authorization of a 
repo participant to liquidate collateral applies “only” if the 
liquidation results in excess proceeds.  This Court used the 
word “only” to contrast the ordinary division between § 559 
with § 562, not to create a binding either/or proposition.  Am. 
Home Mortg., 637 F.3d at 255-56.  Judge Rendell’s 
concurrence implicitly supports this narrow comparative 
interpretation, stating that a liquidation of a repurchase 
agreement is exempt from automatic stay provisions, making 
no mention of whether an excess is necessary for the 
protections of § 559.  Id. at 258 (Rendell, J., concurring).  Our 
reading avoids any conflict with the plain text of § 559.  
Furthermore, the case before us involves a “loss” or “shortfall” 
without a claim for “damages,” presenting unique 
circumstances not addressed in American Home Mortgage. 
The few cases and treatises that explore this issue show 
that a repo participant can liquidate a repurchase agreement 
regardless of whether the sale results in an excess, shortfall, or 
a break-even amount.  See Matter of Bevill, Bresler & 
Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 67 B.R. 557, 596 (D.N.J. 1986) 
(“Any proceeds from the sale of the securities in excess of the 
 25 
 
agreed repurchase price are deemed property of the estate.”); 
In re TMST, Inc., No. 09-17787-DK, 2014 WL 6390312, at *4 
(Bankr. D. Md. Nov. 14, 2014) (“Concomitant to those rights 
granted to the repurchase creditor to liquidate with finality the 
pledged securities, in Sections 559 and 562 Congress 
vouchsafed to the bankruptcy estate the right to any excess 
market value of such securities.”); 5 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY § 559.04 (16th ed. 2019) (“Section 559 
specifies, however, that any excess proceeds or value 
remaining after the nondefaulting party has recovered the 
amounts owed to it by the debtor must be paid to the debtor . . 
. .”); 1 JOAN N. FEENEY ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 
§ 7:19 (5th ed. 2019) (a repo “participant is free to offset or net 
out any termination value . . . .”); 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. 
AND WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 75:4 (3d ed. 2019) (“Code § 559 also contains 
a provision dealing with excess proceeds in the event that a 
repo participant liquidates . . . and the repo participant has 
agreed to deliver any surplus assets to the debtor. In this event, 
any excess . . .  shall be deemed property of the estate . . . .”).  
Although the auction yielded no excess proceeds, the 
protections of § 559 were appropriately applied. 
V 
  Section 559 generally provides an exemption from the 
automatic bankruptcy stay to the extent that a liquidation 
accords with the relevant repurchase agreement.  Thus, Bear 
Stearns’s safe harbor is contingent on its adherence to the 
GMRA—upon default, to honestly and rationally value the 
remaining securities for purposes of crediting HomeBanc’s 
debt.  The Bankruptcy Court held that Bear Stearns valued the 
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SAI in good faith compliance with the GMRA, but HomeBanc 
claims otherwise.16  We exercise plenary review over this 
determination of good faith and agree with the Bankruptcy 
Court that Bear Stearns complied with the GMRA. 
First, HomeBanc contends that the auction did not 
provide the fair market value of the SAI because a sale never 
occurred.  Bear Stearns simply shifted the SAI from the finance 
desk to the mortgage trading desk and made an internal 
accounting adjustment.  The GMRA required that Bear Stearns 
reach a “reasonable opinion” regarding the securities’ “fair 
market value, having regard to such pricing sources and 
methods . . . as . . . [it] consider[ed] appropriate.”  J.A. 1038.  
There was no clause that required Bear Stearns to sell the 
securities to an outside party.  Moreover, whether an exchange 
of funds occurred is immaterial to establishing the securities’ 
fair market value.17 
HomeBanc also asserts that Bear Stearns acted in bad 
faith because it knew or should have known that, given the 
dysfunctional market for mortgage-backed securities in August 
2007, an auction would not identify the fair market value of the 
                                                 
16 On appeal, neither party contests the Bankruptcy Court’s 
conclusion that the GMRA includes a “good faith” standard: 
Bear Stearns was required to act in “good faith” when 
determining the fair market value of the securities at issue.  The 
parties dispute whether Bear Stearns’s actions met that 
standard. 
17 A discount cash flow model, for example, is another way to 
determine fair market value without an actual “sale.” 
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SAI.18  HomeBanc highlights, among other things, that (1) 
several witnesses testified that the mortgage-backed securities 
market was in “turmoil” and “dysfunctional” in August 2007,19 
(2) Bear Stearns’s American Home Mortgage auction, a week 
prior, failed to produce an outside bidder, and (3) Bear Stearns 
reduced its internal valuation of the thirty-seven securities 
from roughly $119 million on Friday, August 3, 2007 to 
approximately $68 million on Monday, August 6, 2007. 
Despite this evidence, the Bankruptcy Court was correct 
in determining that there was good faith where the market for 
                                                 
18 The parties have invoked the term “market dysfunction.”  
Neither the briefs nor oral argument provided substantial 
insight into this term and its meaning.  Although there seems 
to be no accepted definition, dysfunction likely includes low 
liquidity and enough instability in a market such that the 
routine price discovery process is not functioning properly. 
Whether the securities market in August 2007 was 
dysfunctional is a significant question because it bears on 
whether Bear Stearns rationally valued the securities using an 
auction.  In American Home Mortgage, this Court endorsed the 
view that “the market price should be used to determine an 
asset’s value when the market is functioning properly.  It is 
only when the market is dysfunctional and the market price 
does not reflect an asset’s worth should one turn to other 
determinants of value.”  637 F.3d at 257.   
19 A Bear Stearns securities trader testified that the market was 
“dysfunctional” with “little to no liquidity,” and a former Bear 
Stearns senior managing director testified that “we knew it was 
a bad market” and that the market was “illiquid.”  J.A. 870, 
899, 1007-09.    
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mortgage-backed securities was sufficiently functional to 
conduct an auction that complied with the GMRA.  A Bear 
Stearns employee, an economic consultant, and an outside 
executive familiar with the repurchase market all testified that 
the market was turbulent but not dysfunctional.  The record 
also contains substantial additional testimony to support this 
characterization: other traders of mortgage-backed securities 
stated that transactions were occurring in the summer of 2007.  
There is also little evidence indicative of market dysfunction, 
such as potential buyers lacking sufficient information to price 
securities and the absence of any creditworthy market 
participants.  Here, HomeBanc mistakenly equates a declining 
market with a dysfunctional one.  The residual mortgage-
backed securities market was functioning adequately for Bear 
Stearns, in good faith, to value the SAI via an auction. 
Alternatively, HomeBanc argues that the auction 
procedures were flawed, rendering the sale price inaccurate.  
One academic witness testified that the information supplied to 
potential bidders was inadequate, the time given to submit a 
bid unreasonably short, and the bidding rules intentionally 
designed to frighten away outside interest.  This contrasted 
with the testimony of several securities traders who opined that 
the information provided in Bear Stearns’s bid solicitation was 
sufficient to value the securities, the auction provided adequate 
time to formulate a bid, and the bidding rules were attractive 
rather than off-putting.  Bear Stearns’s solicitation reached 
many potential buyers, including several of its competitors.  
Additionally, the auction rules were designed to prevent Bear 
Stearns’s mortgage trading desk from obtaining any 
objectionable advantage—(1) Bear Stearns affiliates had to 
submit their bids thirty minutes before the deadline for outside 
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bids, and (2) Bear Stearns’s legal department, which was 
located in a separate building from the mortgage trading desk, 
collected all the bids.  We will not disturb the Bankruptcy 
Court’s finding that the auction process followed proper 
industry practices.   
HomeBanc also maintains that Bear Stearns did not 
value the SAI in good faith compliance with the GMRA 
because the post-auction value assigned to each of the nine 
SAI, $900,000 a piece, was arbitrary—Bear Stearns never 
justified why it valued each security at $900,000.  The SAI 
were diverse, having different collateral and cash flow rules, 
and Bear Stearns valued each differently weeks before the 
auction.  Thus, HomeBanc insinuates that the allocated amount 
had no relationship to what the securities were actually worth.  
“[T]he $900,00 ‘price’ is simply what remained of Bear 
Stearns’s total bid after subtracting the unchallenged 
valuations attributed to the 27 securities not at issue, neatly 
divided across the securities at issue.”  J.A. at 38-39.     
 The GMRA required a rational, good faith 
determination of the fair market value of the securities, and this 
requirement could be met by a reasonable all-or-nothing bid 
for the securities.  A buyer may allocate the winning bid in a 
variety of ways, but the defaulting party’s debt is always 
credited the same amount: no matter how Bear Stearns divided 
its bid of $60.5 million, HomeBanc’s debt only decreased by 
that lump sum amount.  We see no need to address this 
argument further since the post-auction allocation to individual 
securities says little about whether the all-or-nothing bid 
constituted a fair market valuation.  
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In spite of HomeBanc’s attempts to show otherwise, 
Bear Stearns acted in good faith compliance with the GMRA: 
the market conditions were adequate to ascertain fair market 
value via an auction, and the auction procedures were 
adequate.  Consequently, Bear Stearns rationally accepted the 
auction results as providing the fair market value of the 
remaining thirty-seven securities.  Bear Stearns was obligated 
to follow the GMRA, and it did so. 
VI 
In conclusion, we hold that (1) a Bankruptcy Court’s 
determination of good faith regarding an obligatory post-
default valuation of collateral subject to a repurchase 
agreement receives mixed review.  Factual findings are 
reviewed for clear-error while the ultimate issue of good faith 
receives plenary review; (2) 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(A)(v) 
“damages,” which may trigger the requirements of § 562, 
require a non-breaching party to bring a legal claim for 
damages; (3) the safe harbor protections of 11 U.S.C. § 559 can 
apply to a non-breaching party that has no excess proceeds; and 
(4) Bear Stearns liquidated the securities at issue in good faith 
compliance with the GMRA.  Thus, we will affirm the 
judgment. 
